The worldwide expansion of nuclear energy has been accompanied by concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation. If sited in states that do not possess nuclear weapons technology, some civilian nuclear technologies could provide a route for states or other organizations to acquire nuclear weapons. Metrics for assessing the resistance of a nuclear technology to diversion for non-peaceful uses-proliferation resistance-have been developed, but at present there is no clear consensus on whether and how these metrics are useful to policy decision makers. In 2011, the U.S. Department of Energy asked the National Academies to convene a public workshop addressing the capability of current and potential methodologies for assessing host state proliferation risk and resistance to meet the needs of decision makers. Proliferation risk in nuclear fuel cycles is a summary of presentations and discussions that transpired at the workshop-held on August 1-2, 2011-prepared by a designated rapporteur following the workshop. It does not provide findings and recommendations or represent a consensus reached by the symposium participants or the workshop planning committee. However, several themes emerged through the workshop: nonproliferation and new technologies, separate policy and technical cultures, value of proliferation resistance analysis, usefulness of social science approaches. The workshop was organized as part of a larger project undertaken by the NRC, the next phase of which (following the workshop) will be a consensus study on improving the assessment of proliferation risks associated with nuclear fuel cycles. This study will culminate in a report prepared by a committee of experts with expertise in risk assessment and communication, proliferation metrics and research, nuclear fuel cycle facility design and engineering, international nuclear nonproliferation and national security policy, and nuclear weapons design. This report is planned for completion in the spring of 2013.
|Statement||Sarah C. Case, rapporteur ; Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board, Division on Earth and Life Studies, National Research Council of the National Academies|
|Contributions||National Research Council (U.S.). Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board|
|LC Classifications||TK9153 .P76 2011|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||ix, 100 p.|
|Number of Pages||100|
|LC Control Number||2011277225|
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS Fifth Street, N.W. Washington, DC Proliferation Risk in Nuclear Fuel Cycles is a summary of presentations and discussions that transpired at the workshop-held on August , prepared by a designated rapporteur following the workshop. It does not provide findings and recommendations or represent a. Proliferation Risk in Nuclear Fuel Cycles is a summary of presentations and discussions that transpired at the workshop-held on August , prepared by a designated rapporteur following the workshop. It does not provide findings and recommendations or represent a consensus reached by the symposium participants or the workshop planning committee. Thorium fuel cycles A more far reaching technical proposal has involved the suggestion that alternative fuel cycles based on thorium rather than uranium would decrease the risk of nuclear proliferation by reducing the amounts of plutonium produced in nuclear power programmes. The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) was a major international study assessing the risk of weapons proliferation from nuclear fuel cycles. Since its completion in there have been noticeable changes in the outlook for nuclear by:
• Needs of nuclear fuel cycles (large scale fuel cycle, Pu recycle) • Needs to develop safer, more economical systems • Needs of proliferation-resistant nuclear systems against the increase in nuclear diversion risk. The primary risks regarding nuclear proliferation are: diversion of weapons usable material by nations diversion of weapons usable material by terrorist/theft Within the nuclear fuel cycle, there are various routes in which a potential proliferator may gain access to nuclear by: 3. Nonproliferation Treaty, are more aware of the proliferation risks of plutonium separation. Although a closed-fuel cycle is no longer an urgent task nor necessarily economical, Japan has almost completed the commercial-scale Rokkasho Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Facility. It is ultimately for the Japanese people to decide what. Sustainable fuel cycle options are “those that improve uranium resource utilization, increase energy generation, reduce waste generation, enhance safety, and do not contribute to an increase in proliferation risk.” Many possible fuel cycle options existFile Size: 1MB.
In a closed nuclear fuel cycle, the greatest risk of proliferation is involved in the separated plutonium interim storage, fresh plutonium fuel fabrication and onsite fresh FA transportation stages. This risk is much lower when a technology with no pure plutonium separation is used in the SNF by: 2. This book on nuclear energy and nuclear weapon proliferation contains the papers presented at the symposium and reflects the discussions at the meeting. Contents. PART I. INTRODUCTION B. Jasani Chapter 1. Fuel cycles. 1. An evolutionary strategy for nuclear power F. . that circumstances are changing − proliferation risk is no longer limited to clandestine programs. Iran, having had to bring under safeguards a nuclear program which it was developing in secret, now maintains that the NPT gives any party the right to develop any aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle. Iran’s actions raise the spectre of. In order to limit the risk associated with the construction and operation by NNWSs of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as uranium enrichment plants, these facilities should only be operated in States which provide the highest level of non-proliferation guarantees.